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Foreign banks in Bulgaria, 1875-2002 
 
 
Abstract 
We use the analogy of ecological succession as our conceptual framework.  We apply this 
analogy to the history of foreign banks in Bulgaria and argue that the current predominance 
of foreign banks is unlikely to be permanent, even without government action.  Foreign 
banks have entered Bulgaria several times—before World War I, again after that war, and 
after the fall of Communism in the early 1990s.  The same source countries and even some 
of the same banks that were present before World War II or even World War I, reappear in 
the 1990s.  Government concern with retaining control over credit limited the foreigners’ 
role in the banking system.  However, since 1997 the government has privatized almost all 
the major banks with the result that foreign banks now control over 80 per cent of the 
banking system’s assets. 
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Introduction 
In Bulgaria, as in a number of other transition economies, foreign banks now account 
for the majority of total banking system assets.  Historically, foreign banks have played only 
a limited role in Bulgarian banking.  However, economic problems in the mid-1990s led the 
Bulgarian government to permit foreign banks to acquire Bulgarian banks, especially in 
privatizations.  The result was the present state of affairs, with foreign banks controlling over 
80 percent of assets. 
Foreign domination of the banking system is a novel experience for Bulgaria.  A 
question troubling many observers is whether this state of affairs is likely to be permanent or 
not, at least absent government intervention.  To offer an answer to this question we 
introduce the analogy of ecological succession from the literature on forest evolution.  We 
interpret the history of foreign banks in Bulgaria in light of this analogy.   
 
Ecological succession 
The classical narration of primary succession posits that pioneering species first colonize 
previously uninhabited landforms.  As these pioneering plants increase in size and influence, 
competition between them and the changes they cause in soil and light conditions facilitates 
secondary succession, the establishment of succeeding organisms that are better adapted to 
the emerging conditions.  Eventually there emerges a final self-maintaining community 
(Collier et al. 1973).  Secondary succession may also follow the abandonment of once 
cultivated land or major or minor disturbances such as fire, flood, landslides or tree-falls that 
have left some trace of earlier organic activity (Bormann and Likens 1979).  Succession 
culminates in a climax forest—in a steady-state in which the forest is self-replicating. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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Further research has specified the mechanisms involved.  Tolerance, facilitation and 
reverse interference mechanisms support succession.  The competitive hierarchy mechanism 
slows down or prevents succession.  These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and their 
relative importance in particular cases depends on the climate (Botkin 1993). 
In tolerance early succession species do not affect the rate of recruitment, growth or 
survival of later species.  The early species simply arrive and grow more quickly.  Later 
species can grow during the early succession phase but are more tolerant of the more limited 
resources that prevail when competition is well established.   
In facilitation one species prepares the way for the second.  An extreme case of 
facilitation would have the early species as a necessary condition for the survival of the later 
species.  A less extreme case would have the presence of the early species leading to earlier 
arrival or greater success for later species.   
In reverse interference late succession species interfere with the continuation of early 
succession species.  This contrasts with the competitive hierarchy mechanism in which early 
succession species impede the growth of late succession species.  With competitive hierarchy 
late succession species start to arrive as members of the early succession species reach the 
end of their life-cycle and die out. 
Among pioneering species weeds are prominent.  Weeds are opportunistic plants that 
invade disturbed soil (Elton 1958).  Plants that we consider weeds typically evolved to fill the 
minor role of secondary succession.  As succession proceeds, weeds lose ground but some 
remain in place here and there, ready for the next disaster.  More recently, ecologists have 
broadened the concept of weeds to include plants that appear in or are transplanted to a new 
environment that is far from their original one.  The transplants thrive in the new 
environment because they have left their enemies behind and face no new ones.    William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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The ecological succession model has several striking characteristics.  First, the logic of 
the process means that species that are most prevalent in the early stages of the process 
become far less prevalent later.  Until the system has reached the steady-state one cannot 
treat any snapshot in time as an unbiased estimate of the future state of the system.  Second, 
facilitation and reverse interference mean that it is the very success of the pioneering species 
that brings about their displacement.  As they succeed they change soil and light conditions 
that permit other species to gain a foothold and in time to dominate.   
Like all biological analogies and metaphors, ecological succession has its limitations.  
The most important is that organizations are not organisms.  With organizations, the process 
of variation and selection is Lamarckian (opportunity pull) as well as Darwinian (competition 
push).  Furthermore, organizations can merge and acquire each other.  Still, we believe that 
the analogy can facilitate understanding of the role of foreign banks in Bulgaria. 
There have been four eras in banking in Bulgaria.  In the first, second and fourth we see 
the same pattern of succession, one that consists of three phases.  The first phase is a partial 
opening with the government hesitant about foreign entry.  Only a few foreign banks appear 
and these have a limited role.  One can think of this as the arrival of the first weeds that 
facilitate the later entry of others.  Second, further opening leads to the entry of a number of 
foreign banks.  In the third phase competitive turmoil emerges, with some foreign banks 
closing down and others merging with each other or with domestically-owned banks.  
Unfortunately a fourth phase—steady-state climax—has not yet occurred.   
World War I terminated the first (1875-1918) of the four eras.  An increasingly 
nationalistic government, World War II and the arrival of a Communist regime terminated 
the second era (1919-1944).  The third era (1944-1989) was one of a Communist regime that 
barred entry to foreign banks.  The fourth era (1990-to date) began with the fall of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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Communism and is still underway.  It is our argument that in this present fourth era the 
Bulgarian banking system, left to itself, will eventually achieve a steady state with a foreign 
presence that is much reduced from its current situation in which foreign banks own over 80 
per cent of the assets in banks. 
 
1875 – 1918: The arrival of the Europeans 
To the best of our knowledge, the first bank in Bulgaria was the Imperial Ottoman 
Bank, which entered in 1875 (see below), while Bulgaria was still under Ottoman control.  
Then in 1877-78 the Russo-Turkish War resulted in the expulsion of the Ottoman army 
from what is now Bulgaria.  Bulgaria subsequently achieved the status of a principality under 
the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire.  In 1879 an assembly of notables gathered in 
Turnovo, the medieval capital, to resurrect a Bulgarian state.  One of the new government’s 
first activities was to establish the Bulgarian National Bank (Bulgarska Narodna Banka; 
BNB) in 1879 under its ownership (Avramov 1999).
1 
From then on the BNB became the key Bulgarian bank.  The government used the 
BNB as the bank of issue and as a commercial and development bank (Avramov 1995).  
This is parallel to the situation in Latin America, especially in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico, where government-owned banks with mixed central, development and commercial 
banking functions have dominated from the 19
th century (Marichal 1997).  The St. 
Petersburg banking house of Poliakov and Ginsburg apparently tried to found a joint-stock 
bank of issue in 1880 but the government blocked the attempt.  Later, when the BNB 
suffered difficulties, the government still rebuffed Austrian, French and German offers to 
                                                           
1 The Bank translates “narodna” as “national” but the word carries the connotation of 
Nation or People as in the “Bank of the Bulgarian Nation” or “Bank of the Bulgarian 
People”. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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recapitalize the bank by taking shares in it.  The state also owned or managed the other 
major financial intermediaries: the Poshtenska Spestovna Banka (Postal Savings Bank; est. 
1896), the Bulgarska Zemedelska Banka (BZB; Bulgarian Agricultural Bank), and the 
Bulgarska Centralna Kooperativna Banka (BCKB; Bulgarian Central Cooperative Bank).
2  
The Imperial Ottoman Bank (IOB), despite its name and role as the premier bank of 
the Ottoman Empire, was Anglo-French in ownership.  The IOB established branches in 
Rousse (Rus or Rusçuk; 1875-80 & 1892-99), Varna (1880-82), Plovdiv (Philippopoli; 1878-
99), and Sofia (1890-99).  Turkish speakers represented about 19 per cent of the population 
of Bulgaria (Popoff 1920) but the IOB did not limit its clientele to them.  By the end of the 
1880s the IOB’s lending exceeded that of the BNB, its only competitor (Berov 1999).   
Despite its earlier success, in 1899 the IOB withdrew from Bulgaria.  In 1897 a more 
xenophobic government had replaced the Stambolov regime, which had sought an 
independent path between Russian and Turkish hegemony.  Subsequently and consequently, 
the Bulgarian government passed a new commercial code in 1898 that imposed numerous 
burdensome restrictions on foreign firms (Clay 1990).
3   
                                                           
2 In 1862-3, Midhat Pasha, a Bulgarian Moslem serving as governor, founded a large number 
of autonomous rural credit associations known as “Manafi Umoumie Sandyklar” (credit 
associations of public utility; Popoff 1920).  The credit associations served as treasuries for 
the local administration, accepted deposits at interest and made loans to peasants on 
mortgages or against the guarantee of two solvent landowners.  In 1894 the government 
nationalized the associations and put their administration into the hands of the Ministry of 
Commerce and Agriculture.  Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas arranged financing for the 
associations.  In 1903 the government reorganized the credit associations by combining them 
to create the Bulgarska Zemedelska Banka.  In 1910 the bank spun off its cooperative 
activities to form the Bulgarska Centralna Kooperativna Banka (Popoff 1920). 
3 Lampe and Jackson (1982), however, report that the Imperial Ottoman Bank closed its 
Bulgarian branches in 1895 in response to problems elsewhere in the bank.  Berov (1999) 
agrees with Lampe and Jackson on the reasons in that he cites losses on Turkish and South 
African securities.  However he correctly agrees with Clay that it was in 1899 that the BIO 
finally left.  Kostov (1999) argues that the BIO left because of poor profitability due to a 
series of poor harvests and the decline of grain exports.  He adduces other evidence to 
suggest that the BIO had good relations with the National Party of Bulgaria.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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The instability in the Balkans and in Bulgaria itself and government opposition 
discouraged extensive and sustained economic foreign investment until the mid-1890s or 
later (Flaningam 1961).  The Norddeutsche Bank, the Banque de Salonique and several 
German companies helped found the Bulgarian Lottery Bank (Bulgarska Lottarina Banka) in 
1895 to organize and profit from a lottery (Avramov 1998).
4  This Sofia-based bank was the 
first foreign company to incorporate in Bulgaria.  In 1897 the Industrial Bank [of Russia] 
(Popoff 1920), which may have had its headquarters in Kiev, had a branch in Sofia that 
closed very quickly.
5  After the Revolution of 1905-6 Russian interest in the Balkans waned.  
The next entrant was the Hungarian Commercial Bank of Pest (Pesti Magyar Kereskedelmi 
Bank; PMKB) which entered Bulgaria in 1898 where it established the Targovska Banka 
(Commercial Bank), which in turn established four branches.
6   
Although German banks had no direct operations in Bulgaria, from 1889 on they were 
active in underwriting Bulgarian government debt (Tilly 1991 and 1994; Reisser 1911; 
Strasser 1925; Flaningam 1961).  In 1905, Germany and Bulgaria signed a definitive 
commercial treaty, including a tariff agreement.  This triggered an influx of foreign 
investment in the financial sector.  That year Disconto-Gesellschaft (37 per cent), S. 
Bleichröder (28 per cent), and the Norddeutsche Bank (13 per cent) joined with some 
Bulgarian firms to form the Kreditna Bank in Sofia with a capital of FFr 9mn.  Despite its 
location and political ties the bank was conservative in its operations and remained small.  
                                                           
4 After a hiatus in World War I, the bank recommenced operations and was still operating in 
1925 (Avramov 1998), though probably without foreign ownership. 
5 Popoff does not make clear whether the bank’s name included a reference to Russia or 
whether the reference to Russia is simply an identification of its origin. 
6 Berov (1999) gives the year of founding for the Targovska Banka as 1901.  Avramov (1998) 
says 1903.  This bank apparently began as a limited partnership (komanditno drujestvo).  The 
various dates may reflect reorganizations or changes of status. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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In 1906 the Wiener Bank-Verein, an affiliate of the Deutsche Bank, too entered Bulgaria 
where it established the Balkanska Banka (Banque Balkanique) with a capital of FFr 4mn.  At 
some point, the Wiener Bank-Verein provided 40 per cent of the capital for the Balkanska 
Banka; the Crédit Anversois, the Banque de l’Union Parisienne (BUP) and the Anglo-
Österreichische Bank provided most of the rest.
7  The Balkanska Banka proceeded to open 
seven branches around the country.  The PKMB (29 per cent) collaborated with Banque de 
Paris et des Pays-Bas (Paribas; 59 per cent) and the Allgemeine Österreichisches 
Bodencreditanstalt (13 per cent) to transform the Targovska Banka into the Generalna 
Banka (Banque générale de Bulgarie; Barcsay 1991 and Kövér 1991).  The bank was 
capitalized at FFr 2mn, and so was substantially smaller than the Kreditna and the Balkanska.  
In 1908 Bulgaria declared itself an independent kingdom and no longer subject to the 
Ottoman Empire.  This led to a number of changes in the railroad system and to improved 
prospects for German firms after Germany gained an almost exclusive position in placing 
government contracts (Flaningam 1961).  
Several specialized banks commenced operations between 1905 and 1911.  Austro-
Hungarian capital founded the Bulgarska Ipotekarna Banka.  In 1910 the Balkanska Banka 
founded the Crédit Foncier Bulgare to take over its mortgage operations.  The next year the 
Generalna Banka, the Berliner Handelsgeselschaft and the Banque Internationale de 
Bruxelles together founded the Generalna Ipotekarna Banka na Tsartsvo (Banque générale 
hypothecairé du Royaume de Bulgarie; Kövér 1991).  Apparently Commerz- und Diskonto 
Bank participated in establishing the Banque Danubienne (Russe), and the Ungarische Bank- 
und Handels opened an affiliate in Sofia under the name Bulgarische Bank- und Handels 
                                                           
7 Bonin (1991) says the Wiener Bankverein entered in 1905 and that the BUP and the Société 
Générale took over the bank between 1908 and 1910.  Bussière (1983) reports that the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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(BBH).  Lastly, the Prague Credit Bank’s (Pražská úvěrní banka) Sofia branch also appears to 
have been of some importance. 
In 1911 the Generalna, Kreditna, Balkanska, BBH and Prague held 12 per cent of 
Bulgarian banking assets, the BNB, BZB and BCKB held 74 per cent, and 53 local private 
banks held the rest (Lampe and Jackson 1982).  However, the national banks were slightly 
less profitable in terms of ROA (1.8 per cent) than the private banks (2.0 per cent). 
In 1912 the mortgage-lending sector saw consolidation.  Crédit Foncier Bulgare and 
Generalna Ipotekarna Banka na Tsartsvo merged their operations into the Franco-Bulgarska 
Ipotekarna Banka (Credit Foncier Franco-Bulgare; Kostov 1999).
8  A Russo-Bulgaro-French 
bank, the Banque Commerciale et Foncière des Balkans (the Commercial and Mortgage 
Bank of the Balkans; Avramov 1998) also opened its doors (Anan’ich and Bovykin 1991).  
Originally Crédit Français owned 50 per cent of the bank, the BNB owned 25 per cent, and 
four Russian banks shared 25 per cent.  The intent was for the bank to work under French 
and Russian protection to serve the Bulgarian population in the European part of Turkey 
(Avramov 1998).  Within a year the Russian banks reduced their share to 15 per cent and 
Crédit Français increased its share to 60 per cent.  Lastly, a Belgian company, the Crédit 
Hypothécaire Agricole et Urbain d’Egypt opened a branch in Sofia.  However, between 
conflicts with the Bulgarian government over the right to issue mortgage bonds and the 
onset of the Balkan Wars little came of these ventures. 
During the period from the Balkan Wars (1912-13) through World War I (1914-18), the 
government froze the activities of all foreign-controlled banks (Berov 1999).  Because 
Bulgaria joined the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, the French banks 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Banque de l’Union Parisienne only became involved in 1908.  See also: Lampe and Jackson 
(1982), Berov (1999) and Kostov (1999). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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were forced to withdraw.  At the time the French held a quarter of the capital of four of the 
main banks in the country, the Generalna, the Balkanska, the Crédit Foncier Bulgare and the 
Banque Commerciale et Foncière des Balkans (Plessis and Feiertag 1999). 
The Austrian and Hungarian banks benefited from the withdrawal of the French by 
increasing their stakes.  The PUC and Allgemeine Bodencreditanstalt took control of the 
Generalna.  The Weiner Bankverein, together with other Austro-Hungarian banks, took 
control of the Balkanska.  In 1917 French and Bulgarian investors established the Franco-
Bulgarian Bank for International Trade and British and Bulgarian investors established the 
Lozarska Banka (Winegrowers or Viticulture Bank) but how meaningful these were is 
questionable.
9  Kreditna Banka benefited from the war and opened branches in Varna and 
Rousse, and a short-lived one in Uesküb (Skopje) in Occupied Serbia (now Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia).  The Deutsche Bank opened a branch in Sofia in 1917.  In 1918 the 
Bulgarische Bank- und Handels received a capital infusion and changed its name to the 
Banque Hongroise-Bulgare.  The Allgemeine Depositenbank led another Austro-Hungarian 
group to found the Banque du Credit Austro-Bulgare (Kostov 1999). 
One foreign country is notable for its absence during the pre-War period.  Throughout 
the Ottoman period Greeks acted as a middleman minority in the Balkan provinces and 
elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire (Kourvetaris 1988; Dritsas 1994).  Though kinship-based 
networks of merchants, ship owners and bankers tied the Greek Diaspora together and 
Greek merchants established private banks in Odessa (Mingolou and Louri 1997), Greek 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 Berov (1999) reports that the Bulgarska Ipotekarna Banka merged with the Banque 
Générale Hypothécaire du Royaume de Bulgarie to form the Crédit Foncier Bulgare. 
9 Bulgaria was allied with Germany and Austria in the war and banking business was at a 
standstill. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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merchants apparently did not establish any private banks in Bulgaria.
10  The Greek presence 
in Bulgaria lasted until the ethnic cleansing that followed the end of World War I.  The 
Treaty of Neuilly-Sur-Seine (1919) and the Kafantaris-Moloff Accord (1926) provided for 
the voluntary and compensated exchange of Bulgarians from Thessaloniki and surroundings 
for Greeks from Bulgaria (Zerriffi 1999). 
 
1918 – World War II: Return and retreat 
The disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Tsarist Russian empires 
provided an opportunity for banks based in the countries of the victorious Allies to 
penetrate the Balkans, Central Europe, and even further afield.  The war and its aftermath 
created disturbed soil in many places. In Bulgaria, where law and regulation, and banks were 
already in place, the result was a situation of secondary succession, unlike the situation of 
primary succession before the war.  The scenario of opportunistic entry, consolidation and 
shake-out, and increasing dominance of domestic institutions repeated itself before the onset 
of the Great Depression and the rise of Fascism in Europe changed the environment again. 
The end of the war brought a rush to establish banks including a number of banks with 
foreign interest.  After the War, the German owners handed over the Kreditna Bank to the 
Bulgarian owners.  However in 1921, a German manager from the Disconto-Gesellschaft 
joined the board.  The Deutsche Bank’s branch had cut back operations and was supposed 
to be liquidated but in 1921 it resumed its operations (Strasser 1925). 
The Banque de l’Union Parisienne (BUP) re-involved itself with the Balkanska Banka 
and increased its shareholding.  With the agreement of the other shareholders the BUP took 
a dominant position on the executive committee (Bussière 1983).  (The other major 
                                                           
10 These authors discuss Greek private banks in Odessa but have no mention of Varna or William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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shareholders in the Balkanska Banka were the Hungarian General Credit Bank (Magyar 
Áltálanos Hitelbank; itself heavily foreign-owned), the Creditanstalt, Société Générale de 
Belgique and the Weiner Bank-Verein. 
One of the most important entrants was the Banca Commerciale Italiana e Bulgara 
(BCIB; Bulcomit), which the Banca Commerciale Italiana (BCI) and the Assiccurazioni 
Generali established in 1919 to finance trade between Italy and Bulgaria (Di Quirico 1999; 
Stanciu 2000).  BCIB had a head office in Sofia and branches in Burgas, Varna and Plovdiv.  
It financed the tobacco industry and was the main non-governmental bank in Bulgaria. 
The Czech investors who had started to establish the Prague Credit Bank in 1914 
reorganized the bank in 1920 and registered it as a joint-stock company in 1922.  This 
became the center of an industrial group (Berov 1995 and 1999; Kostov 1999).  
The Franco-Bulgarian Bank for International Trade too was reorganized in 1920.  
Apparently the French investors were the Crédit Français, the Caisse Commerciale et 
Industrielle de Paris, the Crédit Foncier du Brésil et de l’Amérique du Sud (in Paris), and the 
Banka Franco-Romana (in Bucharest).  The bank created an industrial group that played an 
important role in the Tobacco Cartel.   
In 1920, Crédit Foncier d’Algérie et Tunisie (60 per cent), Banque Belge pour l’Etranger 
(35 per cent) and Angel Kujumdgiiski (5 per cent) established the French-Belgian Limited 
Joint-Stock Company.  The company formed a group of some nine industrial and 
commercial companies.  In 1923 the company became the Banque Franco-Belge de Bulgarie.  
This bank established three subsidiaries: Banque de Plovdiv, Banque Bulgare du Nord in 
Rousse, and Banque Bulgaro-Belge in Burgas (Kostov 1999). 
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In 1921 Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas took a stake in the until then entirely Bulgarian 
Bulgarska Targovska Banka (Bulgarian Commercial Bank).
11 
There were some other small foreign banks in Sofia that did not last out the decade 
(Berov 1999; Kostov 1999).  These were the Bulgarian-American Bank (est. 1911; 
reorganized 1920); the Banque Hongroise-Bulgare (re-est. 1921; reorganized 1922); the 
Lozarska Banka (re-organized in 1922 with a small amount of British investment and in 
liquidation in 1925); and the Austria-Bulgarian Credit Bank.  The Banque Internationale de 
Bulgarie also had some minor foreign ownership.  
The Allgemeine Österreichische Bodencreditanstalt acquired an interest in the Banque 
Générale de Bulgarie through the PMKB and Paribas played an important role in stabilizing 
the bank.  The Bodencreditanstalt itself had amongst its foreign shareholders the 
Amsterdamsche Bank, which now is part of ABN AMRO (Cottrell 1983).  In 1925-26 the 
Banque Générale de Bulgarie absorbed the Banque Hongroise-Bulgare, which had had as its 
principal shareholder the Anglo-Hungarian Bank (Kostov 1999). 
As it withdrew from commercial banking after 1926, the BNB spun off its mortgage 
operations into a new Bulgarska Ipotekarna Banka.  This bank had mostly foreign owners 
but at the time the government retained the option to buy the bank in ten years. 
In 1928 the Kreditna Banka took over the business of the Deutsche Bank’s branch.  In 
the same year, its owners reorganized the moribund Credit Foncier Franco-Bulgare.  The 
Balkanska Banka merged with the Banque Franco-Belge de Bulgarie to form the Banque 
Franco-Belge et Balkanique (Bussière 1983).  The Banque Franco-Belge was a subsidiary of 
the Belgian Banque pour l’Étranger, which was a member of the Société Générale de 
Belgique group and an owner of Balkanska.  
                                                           
11 Kostov (1999) says 33% and 1921.  Berov (1999) says 25% and 1926. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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By 1929, the foreign banks accounted for 45 per cent of the assets of Bulgarian private 
banks (Avramov 1995). The foreign banks dominated the four Bulgarian non-government 
banks in Sofia and foreign banks accounted for 31 per cent of bank capital in Bulgaria as a 
whole (Lampe and Jackson 1982).  Still, a small number of other state and quasi-public banks 
dominated the banking system even though during 1926-28 the BNB had withdrawn from 
commercial banking and become solely a bank of issue.   
In 1930, the Franco-Bulgarian Bank for International Trade and the Banque de Crédit 
Nationale merged into the entirely Bulgarian-owned Bulgarska Banka (est. 1918), which also 
acquired several other small Bulgarian banks and re-named itself Saedineni Bulgarski Banki 
(Union de Banques Bulgares).  
During the Depression the foreign banks shrank their operations and repatriated capital, 
especially in advance of the imposition of exchange controls in 1931.  The Balkanska Banka 
closed six of its seven branches and withdrew from its subsidiaries, especially the Fabriques 
des Tabacs Reunies (Plessis and Feieretag 1999).  The foreign banks’ share of deposits in 
private banks fell to 20 per cent by the end of 1931 and 7 per cent by 1934 (Avramov 1985).   
After 1933 the non-German banks’ withdrawal was also a consequence of Bulgaria’s 
increasing political and economic orientation towards Nazi Germany (Berov 1995).  Bulgaria 
entered into bilateral trading agreements with Germany covering 88 per cent of its 
agricultural exports (Hunter 1993).  The result was to skew the Bulgarian economy towards 
Germany and away from the European free trade zone and to reduce greatly the scope for 
trade financing by non-German banks (Plessis and Feiertag 1999).  During the 1930s, the 
owners of the Generalna Banka and the Crédit Foncier Franco-Bulgare followed a policy of 
reducing their capital commitment.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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In 1934 the Bulgarska Zemedelska Banka merged with the Bulgarska Centralna 
Kooperativna Banka to form the Bulgarska Zemedelska i Kooperativna Banka (BZKB).  
The government, with the support and participation of the BZKB, formed the partly state-
controlled Bulgarska Kreditna Banka (Bulgarian Credit Bank) by combining numerous 
smaller banks including the Saedineni Bulgarski Banki.
12  By 1936, state financial institutions 
accounted for two-thirds of all deposits and three quarters of all new credit (Lampe and 
Jackson 1982). 
In 1937 the government exercised its options and acquired the Bulgarska Ipotekarna 
Banka, buying out its foreign and domestic owners.
13  Paribas, which had a stake in both the 
Generalna Banka and the Bulgarska Targovska Banka, tried unsuccessfully to promote a 
merger between them.  In 1938 Generalna Banka merged with the Banque Franco-Belge et 
Balkanique.   The BUP and the Banque Belge pour l’Etranger withdrew and the merged 
bank took on the name Banque Franco-Bulgare.   
Shortly before the Anschluss, German groups developed an interest in Austrian 
companies and banks with a view, inter alia, to using Austria as a bridge to the Balkans (Matis 
and Weber 1992).  The Creditanstalt in particular revived the interest and involvement in 
Bulgaria that had waned during the 1930s.
14  Thus at the onset of the war, the primary banks 
with foreign ownership were the Kreditna Banka, the Banque Franco-Bulgare, the Italian- 
                                                           
12 Some of the others included the Banque Internationale de Bulgarie, the Banque de 
Bourgas, and the Banque de Crédit et Commerce de Tirnovo. 
13 At the time of the bank’s founding in 1927, the government retained an option to acquire 
the shares in ten years. 
14 The Creditanstalt took over the Austrian business of the Anglo-Austrian Bank in 1926.  It 
then took over the Bodencreditanstalt in 1929.  Lastly, it took over the Weiner Bankverein 
and the Niederösterreichische Escompte-Gesselschaft in 1933.  These acquisitions made the 
Creditanstalt almost a monobank within Austria (Cottrell 1998).  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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Bulgarian Commercial Bank and the Anglo-Prague Credit Bank.
15  However, by then the 
foreign banks’ share of commercial bank assets had fallen to 34 per cent (Kostov 1999). 
Bulgaria, partially for irredentist and partially for precautionary reasons, allied itself with 
the Axis powers.  But for philo-Russian reasons it refused to declare war on Russia or to 
deploy troops outside the Balkans.  Lampe and Jackson (1982) report that during World War 
II all the foreign banks other than Banque Franco-Bulgare were German or Italian. 
On 5 September 1944 the USSR declared war on Bulgaria and the Soviet Army invaded 
the country.  A coup by the domestic Communist movement and the Military League on 9 
September 1944 enabled the Fatherland Front Government to come to power before the 
Red Army reached Sofia.  A 1946 referendum abolished the monarchy; the seven-year-old 
Tsar Simeon ІІ left Bulgaria for Egypt via Turkey.  (He eventually settled in Spain but 
became Prime Minster of Bulgaria in 2001.)   
During 1944-47 the government started to buy all the banks.  Then the 1947 Banking 
Law nationalized all the banks, with the exception of the Kreditna Banka.  The Bulgarian 
government exempted from nationalization all former German property expropriated and 
transferred to the Soviet Union as reparations, which included Kreditna (Sipkov 1958).  The 
Bulgarian government completed its takeover of the Banque Franco-Bulgare by formally 
buying out Paribas.  Among the foreign-owned banks that it also took over were the Prague 
Credit Bank’s branch, the Italian-Bulgarian Commercial Bank, the Macedonian National 
Bank and the Bulgarian Discount Bank.   
                                                           
15 In 1930 the Prague Credit Bank merged with the Anglo-Czechoslovakian Bank (Anglo-
československá banka) and the Czech Commercial Bank (Česká komerční banka) to form 
the Anglo-Czechoslovak and Prague Credit Bank.  In 1938, the bank changed its name to 
the Anglo-Prague Credit Bank.  In 1940, after Germany declared the Protectorate of 
Bohemia and Moravia, the bank changed its name to Prague Credit Bank.  Although 
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The arrival of a Communist regime meant the end of any role for foreign banks.  All 
banking functions became the responsibility of the BNB (Miller and Petranov 1996).  In 
1951 the Government changed the BNB’s articles of association, making the BNB a 
government agency subordinated to the Council of Ministers and without ministerial status.  
The Government also established the State Savings Bank (DSK), which received a monopoly 
over accounts for individuals. 
In terms of our ecological metaphor, the system went into secondary succession 
immediately after World War I and was well on to its way to a steady-state situation with 
dominance of domestic banks by the late 1930s.  However, from the mid-1920s on, 
successive governments imposed acted to create what one might call a plantation system 
(monoculture), a process that reached its full extent under the Communists. 
 
The Communist Era 
As one would expect, during the Communist Regime (1944-1989) domestic private 
banks did not exist and the regime excluded foreign banks.  Amongst Satellite states, the 
Bulgarians applied the Soviet model too faithfully (Šević 2000).  Bulgaria had a typical, 
Soviet-type “monobank” system (Pindak 1973).  In the ecological succession metaphor, the 
banking system was a mono-crop plantation.  Variety was suppressed and so were weeds. 
The mid-1960s saw some changes.  In 1964, Bulgaria established the Bulgarian 
Foreign Trade Bank (BFTB) out of the foreign operations of the BNB, as the regimes in 
Poland, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany created similar institutions. As 
Bulgaria’s foreign trade bank, BFTB established representative offices in London (1964), 
Frankfurt (1980) and Vienna (1986).  It incorporated the Litex Bank (Lebanese International 
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Trade & Exchange) in Lebanon as a subsidiary.  In 1987, BFTB (49 per cent) and the 
Bayerische Vereinsbank (51 per cent) established the joint venture Bayerisch-Bulgarische 
Handelsbank GmbH, with its head office in Munich.  In 1988, BFTB (61 per cent) and the 
Soviet Union’s Vnesheconombank (39 per cent) established Bulgarsovinvest Bulgarian-
Russian Joint Finance Company. 
Some further abortive reforms and changes followed.  Bulgaria combined the state 
investment bank with the BNB, but then in 1968, decided to convert the BNB’s commercial 
banking operations into two branch banks, the Bank for Industry, Transport and Building, 
and the Bank for Agriculture and Trade.  The two banks opened no branches and in 1971 
the BNB re-absorbed them. 
In 1980 (and possibly for some years around that year) Banco di Napoli maintained a 
representative office in Sofia.  Unfortunately we know no more about this. 
In 1981 the government established Mineralbank to lend to small and medium 
enterprises.  Then in 1987 it established several new banks to specialize in lending to 
different sectors of the economy.
16  The intent was to move towards a two-tier banking 
system with the BNB becoming purely a central bank, responsible for supervision of 
separate commercial banks.  In 1989 the government converted 59 of the BNB’s branches, 
which were spread throughout the country, into unit banks.  The BNB initially owned all the 
capital of these banks.  In time, the other government banks and the major government 
firms came to acquire shares too.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Bank).  By that time the Bulgarian government had already nationalized the branch in Sofia. 
16 The seven were the Agricultural and Cooperative Bank, the Biochemical Bank, the 
Construction Bank, the Economic Bank, the Electronics Bank, the Transportation Bank, 
and the Transport, Agricultural, and Building Equipment Bank, which was also known as 
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The Post-Communist Era to the Currency Board 
The regime of Todor Zhivkov, Bulgaria's totalitarian ruler since the mid-1950s, ended 
on November 10, 1989, just one day after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  However, Bulgaria’s 
"revolution" was essentially an internal coup within the Communist Party, not a popular 
revolt like those that brought down the other European Communist regimes.  Zhikov was 
an acute pragmatist, for instance Stalinist during the Stalinist regime, but not in sympathy 
with those in the Party who wanted liberalization.  The Communist Party renamed itself the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party and won the subsequent election after Bulgaria became a 
parliamentary democracy in 1990.  The new government only nominally embraced a liberal 
agenda; not understanding free markets, it made only those changes it was forced to make.   
Still, the transition governments of 1989-90 passed several banking system reforms.  
The Law on the Bulgarian National Bank (1991) returned the BNB to the role of Central 
Bank with monetary and regulatory powers and responsible to Parliament.  In 1992 the 
government enacted the Law on Banks and Credit Activity, which established the current 
legal framework for the banking system (Ignatiev 1997).  The law eased the conditions for 
the chartering of new banks and the number of private banks grew rapidly.  The Act 
authorized the licensing of subsidiaries of foreign banks but not branches.
17  It also 
stipulated that acquisition of more than 5 per cent of the total voting shares in a bank 
required BNB permission (Dobrinsky 1994).  Table 1 presents the evolution of the structure 
of the Bulgarian banking system from 1991 to 2000. 
The collapse of the Communist regime resulted in a new period of disturbed soil.  Like 
the period 1878-1905 the period 1990-1997 was one in which the BNB and other 
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government-owned banks dominated the scene and the government itself was only 
minimally accepting of the entry of foreign banks; it permitted foreign banks to enter only 
with de novo branches, affiliates and subsidiaries.  Some foreign banks made trial forays but 
conditions were not yet propitious for large-scale entry.  Consequently, the foreign banks’ 
share of banking system assets remained in the single digits.  
The new banks that the government had created in 1987 and 1989 were too small and 
undiversified either in terms of their sector specialization or geographic scope to be viable.  
In 1993 the government created United Bulgarian Bank (UBB), Expressbank, Hebros Bank 
(HB) and Sofiabank to merge some of the sector banks and local banks that it had created.  
UBB consolidated 22 banks.
18  Varna-based Expressbank consolidated 13 commercial 
banks.
19  Plovdiv-based HB consolidated 11 banks.
20  Sofiabank merged Hemus, Electronika, 
Sofia and Kazanlak Commercial Banks.  Even so, the new banks were subject to a failure of 
governance and performed badly (Dilova-Kirkowa 1999).  Because other government banks 
and the major government firms owned these banks the banks were owned by their primary 
clients and amassed non-performing loans (Minkov 1992). 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank (Austria) appears to have opened a representative office in 1989 
and to have taken a 33 per cent participation in the Bank of Agricultural Credit in Sofia from 
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 Authorities permit only subsidiaries when they wish to increase the responsiveness of the 
foreign banks to the authorities or when they wish to limit the foreign banks’ 
competitiveness vis-à-vis corporate clients (Tschoegl 1981).   
18 The 22 were: Stroybank, Doverie, Iskur Commercial Bank, and the commercial banks of 
Rousse, Vratsa, Gabrovo, Kurdjali, Lovech, Pazardjik, Pernik, Pleven, Peshtera, Popovo, 
Montana, Samokov, Sliven, Turgovishte, Haskovo, Shoumen, Nova Zagora, Elhovo and 
Botevgrad.  
19 The 13 were: Transport Bank of Varna, Vuzrazhdane Commercial Bank of Sofia and the 
Varna, Gotse Delchev, Devin, Doupnitsa, Kyustendil, Provadia, Razgrad, Silistra, Smolyan 
and Cherven Bryag commercial banks.   
20 The 11 were: Agricultural and Cooperative Bank, Agrobank of Plovdiv, Commercial Bank 
Vitosha of Sofia, Commercial Bank Trakia of Dimitrovgrad, and Commercial Banks Plovdiv, 
Blagoevgrad, Veliko Turnovo, Assenovgrad, Mezdra, Purvomai, Troyan and Chepelare. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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which it withdrew when it became clear that it would not be able to acquire majority control.  
Ionian Bank established a representative office in 1993. 
In 1994 the government rescinded its ban on branches of foreign banks and ING Bank 
became the first foreign bank to establish a branch.  Several Bulgarian and Russian 
institutions came together to found the Bulgarian-Russian Investment Bank (BRIBank) with 
50-50 Bulgarian and Russian ownership.  (BRIBank also established a representative office in 
Moscow.)  BFTB changed its name to Bulbank, acquired Bourgas Commercial Bank and 
Stara Zagora Commercial Bank and reincorporated Bulgarsovinvest as Corporate 
Commercial Bank AD, still with 61 per cent Bulbank ownership.   
In 1995 two more foreign banks entered.  Xios Bank opened a branch and Raiffeisen 
Zentralbank established a subsidiary.  In the continuing process of domestic consolidation 
Biochim Bank (Biochim) acquired Serdika Commercial Bank, Sofia Bank and SIRBank 
(Specialized Insurance and Reinsurance Bank). 
In 1996 Ionian Bank and Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechsel-Bank each opened a 
branch.  The newly founded (1991) Egnatia Bank from Thessaloniki apparently also had a 
short-lived representative office or branch.  Two joint ventures commenced operation. One 
was the Bulgarian Investment Bank (BIB).  The foreign shareholders included the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD; 35 per cent), UBB (15 per cent), 
Biochim (11 per cent), Hebros Bank (5 per cent), Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP; 15 per 
cent) and others.  Commercial Bank of Greece (CBG) took a 20 per cent direct stake in the 
bank and an 11 per cent indirect stake, as well as the management of the bank.  Later, BIB 
changed its name to International Commercial Bank and then to Commercial Bank of 
Greece (Bulgaria) as the CBG bought out the other owners.  Lastly, Banque Nationale de William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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Paris and Dresdner Bank formed BNP-Dresdner (Bulgaria) with each taking owning 40 per 
cent and the EBRD owning 20 per cent. 
In March 1997 Istrocapital, a Slovakian investment group, received BNB permission to 
recapitalize the failed Bulgarian private Mollov Bank, which it renamed Eurobank.  The 
recapitalization, brought foreign ownership in Eurobank to 92 per cent.  Allianz Bulgaria 
Holdings acquired the failed private Yambol Commercial Bank (est. 1989) and renamed it 
Bulgaria-Invest Commercial Bank.  The EBRD took a 20 per cent stake in First Investment 
Bank.  National Bank of Greece and Société Générale each also opened a branch. 
During this period, of the six private banks created in 1991, two—International Bank 
for Trade and Development Bank (IBTD), and International Bank for Investment and 
Development (IBID)—also had some foreign participation.  IBTD is still operating and 
apparently now has no foreign ownership. IBID began as a 50/50 US-Bulgarian joint 
venture involving several wealthy investors.
21  In 1995 Bulgarian interests bought out the 
foreign shareholding but the bank closed its doors in April 1997.  
Some other foreign banks may have had representative offices.  In 1996 ABN AMRO 
of the Netherlands, the Agricultural Bank of Greece, Creditanstalt Bankverein from Austria, 
and Macedonia Thrace Bank from Greece all had representative offices in Sofia. 
Lastly, foreign banks also established a presence and exerted an influence through 
contractual means.  Several acted as consultants to Bulgarian banks through twinning 
arrangements or other formal or informal contractual arrangements.  In a twinning 
                                                           
21 These included Frank Carlucci (the former a former Secretary of Defense in the Reagan 
Administration and a Deputy Director of the CIA during the Carter Administration), and a 
Mr. Ansari, a former Iranian Minister of Finance.  Carlucci may have been acting on behalf 
of The Carlyle Group (est. 1987), a private global investment firm that originates, structures 
and acts as lead equity investor in management buyouts, strategic minority equity 
investments, equity private placements, consolidations and buildups, and growth capital 
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arrangement the foreign bank sends staff to the host-country bank to introduce western 
banking and technology and to train staff.  The incentive for the foreign bank is the 
possibility that if it wishes to it may be allowed to take a stake in its twin (Mondschaen and 
Opiela 1997).  ABN AMRO twinned with Biochim Bank in a project funded by PHARE 
and Allied Irish Bank twinned with UBB.  The ABN AMRO-Biochim twinning, however, 
only lasted six months before the Bulgarian government dismissed the foreign managers.  
Peter Jotev, then Deputy Prime Minister and Executive Director of the BCC, explained that 
a clause in the management contract stipulated its termination if the government initiated 
privatization procedures.  At least three different subsequent attempts to privatize Biochim 
fell through before the government finally succeeded in 2002. 
Despite the phased liberalization of entry and accumulation of foreign entrants, at mid-
1997 foreign banks were a minor part of the banking sector in Bulgaria, at least in terms of 
their share of the assets in the banking system.  Between 1993 and the end of June 1997, the 
foreign share of the assets of the banking system grew from 0.1 per cent to 4.9 per cent.  
(These figures understate the foreign share of loans, as they do not recognize loans to 
Bulgarian borrowers on the books of banks outside Bulgaria.)   
In 1995 Bulgaria was well positioned for economic recovery following the shock of the 
liberalization that had begun in 1989.  Instead, in early 1996 problems in the banking system 
(loans to government companies) led to a bank panic that in turn led to a currency crisis and 
a brief hyperinflation.  In early 1997 the government announced that it would institute a 
currency board system and other reforms and the crisis subsided.  In all, the period from 
1991 through the twin (banking and currency) crises caused Bulgaria a loss of about 42 per 
cent of GDP (Tang et al., 2000). 
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After the Installation of the Currency Board 
In 1997, Bulgaria finally underwent its Transition.  Ivan Kostov, of the United 
Democratic Forces, became Prime Minister, having defeated the Bulgarian Socialist Party, 
the successor to the Communist Party.  As part of a series of measures aimed at “limiting 
Leviathan”, in June 1997 the Government adopted a currency board, which removed the 
Government’s control over monetary policy and stabilized the currency. The government 
also pushed forward privatization of the banking system to limit its own power to use the 
banking system to support bankrupt firms (Koford 2000).  Lastly, the government favored 
the entry of foreign banks because these could draw on their parents for liquidity as the 
currency board system limited the BNB’s ability to act as a lender of last resort (Šević 2000).   
In September of 1997, Bank Moscovy purchased 8 per cent of Sofia Bank.  In October, 
the US investment firm Wasserstein Perella (WP) took a 24.7 per cent stake in BRIBank 
through WP's investment arm Emerging Markets Finance.  WP also took a position on the 
supervisory board.  Local legal entities and individuals held the remainder of the bank's 
equity with no one party holding more than 5 per cent.  Lastly, Naftex Oil Trading acquired 
25 per cent of International Orthodox Bank Sveti (St.) Nikola.  Several offshore companies 
owned another 54 per cent.  Until the Bulgarian government ordered it to change, Naftex 
had used the name Yukos Petroleum - Bulgaria though it was unrelated to the Russian 
Yukos oil company.   
The government also succeeded in privatizing UBB at the end of 1997.  The initial 
foreign ownership of UBB was 35 per cent Bulbank (the government-owned ex-Bulgarian 
Foreign Trade Bank), 35 per cent EBRD and 30 per cent Oppenheimer & Co. on behalf of 
several investment funds specializing in emerging markets.  This meant that control de facto 
remained in the hands of the Bulgarian government.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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The 1998 privatization of Post Bank put control of that institution unambiguously in 
private hands.  Alico (the life insurance subsidiary of the AIG insurance group) and 
Consolidated Eurofinance Holdings (a Swiss firm owned by the Greek Latsis oil and 
shipping group and the owner of Athens-based EFG Eurobank), acquired 78 per cent of 
Post Bank (PB) for US$38m after negotiations with Nomura International collapsed.  The 
Bulgarian Posts, Bulgarian Telecommunications Company, State Insurance Institute, DSK 
Bank and the National Palace of Culture held the remainder of the shares.  PB was one of 
the largest Bulgarian banks with 28 branches and 84 offices and customer services desks.  PB 
also has an agreement with the Bulgarian Post Office for the bank to work through postal 
system’s 2,760 post offices.  The purchase agreement committed the owners for the next five 
years to turn over 10 per cent of pre-tax profits to charities and non-profit institutions in 
Bulgaria via the Bulgarian government.  
That same year, T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, a Turkish bank, opened a branch in Bulgaria.  This 
was the first operation in Bulgaria by a Turkish bank since the departure of the Ottoman 
Bank.  Despite the ethnic cleansing of the Convention of Adrianople (1913) and the 
Communist regime’s encouragement of Turkish emigration (Erhard 1991), Bulgaria still has 
a large Turkish minority.  Also, Turkish firms are starting to set up plants across the border 
in Bulgaria to use as a base for circumventing European Union and US textile quotas. 
The Bayerisch-Bulgarische Handelsbank GmbH became HypoVereinsBank Bulgaria.
22  
Piraeus Bank acquired the Macedonia Thrace Bank.  Bulbank also wholly-acquired its 
domestic subsidiary, Corporate Commercial Bank, but sold Litex Bank to local investors in 
                                                           
22 Bayerische Vereins Bank and Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechsel-Bank merged in 1999 
to form HypoVereinsbank.  In 2002, HypoVereinsBank Bulgaria became HVB Bulgaria. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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Lebanon.
23  BRIBank changed its name to Bulgarian Reconstruction and Investment Bank – 
BRIBank – as Russian ownership fell to less than 1 per cent following a crisis there. 
In fall 1999, Société Générale (France) purchased Expressbank from the Government 
for US$39m.  After its privatization, the bank took the name SG Expressbank. 
Later, Regent Pacific Group acquired Hebros Commercial Bank for US$24m in a 
privatization.  Now iRegent pledged to invest US$ 5m in 2000, US$ 3m in 2001, and US$ 
2m in 2002 to help further recapitalize the bank.  The iRegent Group is an investment 
management company specializing in emerging-markets.
24 
Demirbank, the second Turkish bank to enter Bulgaria, established a subsidiary.  
Oppenheimer sold part of its stake (17 per cent of the total) in UBB to a subsidiary of the 
American International Group (AIG), Cyprus-based Jodral Enterprises.  Piraeus Bank 
acquired Xios Bank.  The International Orthodox Bank Sveti (St.) Nikola bank changed its 
name to Neftinvestbank.  The BNB allowed Refco Capital Markets, part of the Refco 
Group, to buy 20 per cent of the shares of BRIBank.
25   
In 2000 Bulbank sold its shares in Corporate Commercial Bank (99.9 per cent), UBB 
(35 per cent) and HypoVereinsBank Bulgaria (49 per cent) as part of its preparation for 
                                                           
23 It apparently sold Litex, which no longer had a role in the bank’s strategy, to raise capital 
(Dilova-Kirkowa 1999). 
24 The iRegent Group is registered on the Isle of Man and quoted on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange.  In 2002 Regent Europe bought back the 20 per cent stake in itself held by 
iRegent and changed its name to Charlemagne Capital.  For an interesting discussion of 
Charlemagne’s activities in Croatia see Hickey (2001).  Charlemagne’s activities and strategy 
are similar to those of iRegent and the two continue to collaborate. 
25 The Refco Group is named after Ray E Friedman, a former livestock trader who sold the 
business to his stepson, Thomas H. Dittmer, in 1974.  The US-based firm became active in 
commodity futures trading and is now a diversified financial services firm.  In May 1999, 
Refco entered into alliance with Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft-BAWAG, Austria's 4th 
largest bank. Under this alliance, BAWAG acquired 10% of Refco.  Dittmer and senior 
officers of the firm apparently hold the remainder of the shares. Bayerisches Landesbank 
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privatization.  Then the Bank Consolidation Company (BCC) completed the privatization of 
Bulbank, selling its shares to UniCredito Italiano (93 per cent) and Allianz (5 per cent). 
National Bank of Greece bought UBB from Bulbank, CIBC Oppenheimer, AIG and 
the EBRD.  The EBRD retained a 10 per cent stake, though NBG had a two-year right of 
first refusal to buy the EBRD’s remaining stake if the EBRD wished to sell.  
BRIBank acquired the insolvent Stopanska Banka (Economic Bank).  Later that year 
BRIBank changed its name to Economic and Investment Bank (EIBank). 
In Turkey, Demirbank Bank failed.  Demirbank (Bulgaria) provided the first instance of 
a foreign institution with operations in Bulgaria undergoing bankruptcy.  The news did not 
cause much of a stir in Bulgaria, though some deposits fled.  The BNB investigated and 
announced that because the Bulgarian subsidiary had sufficiently large short-term deposits in 
European and American banks, there was no need to liquidate the operation.  The Savings 
Deposit Insurance Fund of Turkey sold Demirbank to HSBC, but retained several of the 
subsidiaries.  Later that year the Fund sold Demirbank (Bulgaria).
26 
In 2001, a consortium of foreign development agencies (IFC, DEG, Internationale 
Micro Investitionen Aktiengesellschaft and EBRD) joined with Commerzbank to establish 
ProCredit Bank as a bank specializing in microfinance and lending to small and medium 
enterprises.  The group founded the bank after acquisition talks with Eurobank fell through. 
BNP and Dresdner Bank ended their cooperation in Eastern Europe with BNP taking 
over their joint operations in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, while Dresdner took control of 
their joint operations in Russia, the Czech Republic and Croatia.  UniCredito sold minor 
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Cingillioglu-Dogan consortium also bought Demir Halk-Bank N.V., Demir-Kyrgyz 
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stakes in Bulbank to SIMEST (an Italian company; 2.5 per cent) and the International 
Financial Corporation (5.3 per cent). 
In July 2002 the Bulgarian Bank Consolidation Company was finally able to privatize 
Biochim Bank.  The purchaser was the Bank Austria/Creditanstalt Group (BA/CA), a 
subsidiary of HypoVereinsBank Group.  HypoVereinsBank plans to merge Biochim with its 
subsidiary HVB Bulgaria.  The privatization of Biochim has brought foreign ownership of 
Bulgarian bank assets to about 80 per cent. 
Discussion 
Many of the foreign banks operating in Bulgaria, especially those operating via branches 
or small, wholly-owned subsidiaries, are essentially engaging in normal international banking.  
Examples would include ING, BNP Paribas, Citibank and Raiffeisen.  These banks’ 
borrowers tend to be foreign firms or the most creditworthy of Bulgarian enterprises.  For 
instance, in 2000 Citibank provided a US$77mn loan to help Bulgaria modernize two 
reactors at its Kozloduy nuclear power plant.   
Piraeus Bank and Alpha Bank appear to be a classic case of banks following their 
clients.  The Greek banks began by concentrating on trade finance and serving Greek firms 
in Bulgaria.  Greek firms and individuals rushed back into Bulgaria, Romania, and elsewhere 
in the Balkans and the Black Sea in the early 1990s (Kamaras 2001), reestablishing a presence 
that began before Christ but that had been obliterated during most of the 20
th Century.  
NBG and CBG began the same way though they have gone on to acquire larger banks in 
order to benefit from bringing them up to standard.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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T.C. Ziraat Bankasi and Demirbank similarly follow Turkish business.  Their operations 
may include an element of ethnic banking as well.
27   
After the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire, several Austrian banks followed a Danubian 
strategy (that is, they attempted to expand into countries along the Danube), as did Austrian 
trade generally (Nautz 1994; Preshlenova 1994; Weber 1995).  Today the large Austrian 
banks appear to be trying it again. 
In addition, the transition process and especially privatization has created opportunities 
for opportunistic investors.  The investors include everything from various quangos and 
development banks to banks, investment or private equity firms and individuals betting on 
the success of Transition.  For instance, First Investment Bank (FIB) counts among its 
shareholders the EBRD (20%) and the Vienna-based European Privatization and 
Investment Corp (EPIC; 39%).  EPIC is an investment vehicle that has been purchasing 
shares in privatized companies in Central and Eastern Europe.  Investors like EPIC do not 
intend to manage banks or even to invest for the long term.  Their involvement is almost 
purely financial.  They acquire a wide range of assets and businesses as they can and hope to 
create the bulk of the value to themselves through shrewd deal making.  In time one can 
expect them to exit due either to the success or failure of their investments.  In the case of 
FIB the remaining shares are in the hands of Bulgarian individuals and firms, some of whom 
actually manage the bank.  EPIC is relying in part on the EBRD’s oversight of FIB as the 
EBRD is involved in approving large loans and in agreeing strategy. 
The banks participating in the privatizations such as UniCredito Italiano, National Bank 
of Greece and HypoVereinsBank, and the investors and banks such as iRegent, ALICO-
CEN, Commercial Bank of Greece, and Société Générale are a different story.  They are not 
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just contributing capital.  They expect to earn a return on risk capital but also on the 
management skills, systems and experience that they bring to bear.  These are the analogues 
to the pioneering species and weeds of ecological succession.  iRegent hopes to sell out in 
three to seven years.  Even for the others, their own success will ultimately limit their role.   
The first mechanism is the analog to the tolerance mechanism in ecological succession 
in which the later species are more tolerant of the limited resources that prevail when 
competition is well established.  The competition between foreign banks to raise deposits 
and make loans will reduce the deposit-loan interest spread.  When the foreign banks no 
longer earn rents, this will reduce their incentive to grow, or even to remain.  Furthermore, 
the reduction in spreads should result in an increase the size of the banking sector relative to 
GDP.  In time the nascent Bulgarian-owned banks will be in the best position to benefit 
from this growth. 
The biggest long-run problem for foreign banks is that they have no particular 
advantage when engaging in general commercial and retail banking in already competitive 
markets.  It is not surprising that researchers have found that in industrial countries foreign 
banks tend to have lower margins and profits than domestic banks whereas the opposite 
holds true in developing countries (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 1999; Claessens et al., 
2001).
28  Thus in industrial countries foreign banks tend to avoid the retail market except in 
the niche market of ethnic banking (Tschoegl 1987).  
Furthermore, the principle of comparative advantage implies that economic agents, 
whether individuals, firms or countries, do best when each specializes in what it does most 
best or least worst.  Thus, even if the foreign banks are better than local banks at both 
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foreign and corporate banking on the one hand and retail banking on the other, the local 
banks will have a comparative advantage in retail banking.  That is, the local banks will be 
less worse at that than at foreign and corporate banking.   
However, there is good reason to expect that ultimately foreign banks will be less good 
than local banks at some banking business.  Berger et al., (2002) argue, on the basis of 
theories of incomplete contracting, that small banks may do better than large banks at 
processing soft information.  Bank lending to small firms is one area that relies heavily on 
soft information even in developed economies and even more so in Transition economies 
where the infrastructure to produce hard information is still nascent.  Berger et al. (2002) 
find that large banks are less willing than small banks to lend to firms that do not keep 
formal financial records and are more likely to have impersonal, shorter and less exclusive 
relationships with borrowers.  By necessity the foreign banks that have acquired Bulgarian 
banks are large.  It follows then that the foreign-owned banks will, relatively at least, neglect 
lending to small firms, leaving open a niche for small, locally-owned banks eventually to 
enter.  Furthermore, deposit insurance will remove a major impediment to the growth of the 
local banks, the perceived greater safety of large, foreign banks relative to small, local ones. 
The second mechanism supporting the erosion of the prevalence of foreign ownership 
is the analog of the facilitation mechanism in which the presence of the early species 
prepares the way for the later species.  The foreign banks’ efforts to improve their 
acquisitions will increase the competence of the Bulgarian bankers in the banks the 
foreigners have acquired.  In time some of these individuals will leave to found good local 
banks.  Lessard and Tschoegl (1984) found examples of this occurring in Panama in the early 
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1980s as officers of US banks in Panama quit to found their own banks in Panama.  Others 
will have the credibility to be able to muster the capital to execute a management buyout of 
the Bulgarian subsidiary for which they work.  To do so they are likely to draw on the same 
deal-oriented opportunists that are active today and that are not oriented towards exercising 
management control or maintaining a long-term presence. 
Banking itself will also become easier in some ways.  The activities of the foreign banks 
will improve the quality of the borrowers.  The expansion of credit reporting databases and 
the improvement of debt enforcement will reduce the prevalence of fraudulent borrowers.  
Bulgarian lending officers will become more experienced at judging risk.  Experience with 
banks and their demands for information will train borrowers and result in self-selection.  
Borrowers unable or unwilling to meet bankers’ expectations will be driven out of the 
market.  Better borrowers will make it easier for small banks to start.  These will grow and in 
time be in a position to acquire the Bulgarian subsidiary that foreign parents divest. 
Selling implies the existence of a buyer and that may seem far-fetched today.  However, 
it will be less so in twenty years.  Over the next decades not only will successful domestic 
firms and banks develop, but again there will be individual Bulgarians with the personal 
credibility, based probably on their success in foreign-owned banks, to be able to arrange 
funding for acquisitions and buy-outs.   
Already there are banks such as FIB that are Bulgarian-managed though the bulk of the 
shares are in the hands of passive foreign owners.  Also there are several banks—
Roseximbank, Corporate Bank, First Eastern International Bank, International Trade and 
Development Bank and Economic and Investment Bank—that appear to be Bulgarian-
owned in fact if not in law.  Although the majority of the shares in these banks are in the 
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the ultimate owners of these offshore companies are Bulgarian individuals.
29  In time the 
more successful among these banks will be in a position to buy the less successful among the 
foreign-owned banks. 
The third mechanism supporting the erosion of the prevalence of foreign ownership is 
the analog of the competitive hierarchy mechanism in which late succession species start to 
arrive as members of early succession species reach the end of their life-cycle and die out.  
Over time, even those foreign-owned banks that are successful in Bulgaria may leave 
because of problems at home.  In the 1980s, eight Japanese banks had retail subsidiaries in 
California; now three do.  Of the five that have disappeared, three disappeared when 
mergers among the parents resulted in mergers between the subsidiaries.  The survivors are 
the three subsidiaries that still exist.  One subsidiary was sold to a French bank and another 
was sold to a US bank as the parents sought to raise funds to rebuild their own capital bases.  
The point is that departure did not require the failure or even weak performance of the 
California operation.  Departure just required that the parent have a more pressing or 
profitable use for its capital. 
The last mechanism supporting the erosion of the prevalence of foreign ownership is 
the analog of the reverse interference mechanism in which late succession species interfere 
with the continuation of early succession species.  This could occur if the domestic banks 
lobby successfully for restrictions of foreign-owned banks.  Bulgaria’s accession to the EU is 
likely to limit the successful pursuit of protectionism masquerading as nationalism and so 
limit the applicability of this mechanism.   
What all this means is that even when one observes cases where foreign banks initially 
dominate a country’s banking sector, one should expect to see them exit retail banking and 
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specialize in foreign activities pari passu with the emergence of local competitors.  This was 
the experience, for instance, of Cyprus vis-à-vis the British banks (Phylaktis 1988), the 
foreign banks in Saudi Arabia and Oman (Tschoegl 2002a), the foreign banks in Japan 
(Tatewaki 1992 and Tschoegl 1988), and the British banks in Australia (Merrett 1990).  
These cases are all relevant to the case of transition economies because in each case the 
banking system started out wholly in the hands of foreign banks with domestic ownership 
emerging later.  In Cyprus, the British banks had lost their predominance well before the end 
of British colonial rule.  Only in Saudi Arabia did the government exert much economic 
nationalism and as Tschoegl (2002a) points out, it is not clear that this had a material effect 
in speeding up the transition.  More generally, in a recent article Dopico and Wilcox (2002) 
found that foreign banks have a greater share in markets that are underbanked; conversely, 
foreign banks have a smaller presence in mature markets.   
Particularly well-run foreign banks will probably continue the longest.  Those foreign 
banks that are among the largest banks in their home markets may linger also.  Unable for 
anti-trust reasons to grow at home, they will endeavor to grow abroad.  This is the 
motivation for some foreign banks to own retail banking subsidiaries in the US (Tschoegl 
2002b).  Probably Greek banks will be prominent among those seeking to grow abroad.  The 
Greek banking market is already highly concentrated and the Greek government is unlikely 
to favor mergers among the large banks.  Several of the leading Greek banks have already 
embarked on a regional strategy in the Balkans and the Black Sea.  The parents are building 
portfolios of banks, partially through de novo entry, partially through privatization and 
partially through the acquisition of failed banks.  
In all this, the role of accession to the EU and the adoption of the €uro have ambiguous 
effects.  Accession will cause Bulgarian law and regulations to converge towards a pan-
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European model.  The convergence of home and host regulations and practices will make it 
easier for foreign banks to operate in Bulgaria but to the degree that the new regulations 
improve the climate for banks over all, they will also make entry easier for Bulgarian banks.   
However, adoption of the €uro directly, or even indirectly through a currency board, 
reduces the foreign banks’ need to own a domestic bank.  Historically, foreign banks have 
often faced difficulties when their home country clients or large domestic firms clients have 
sought host-country currency loans.  In many countries the thinness of local inter-bank 
money markets has constrained the foreign banks’ lending.  Furthermore, Berlin and Mester 
(1999) argue that access to stable deposits permits banks to offer loans that insulate 
borrowers from exogenous interest rate shocks.  To deal with these issues some foreign 
banks have responded by buying a local bank as a source of local currency deposits.  The 
advent of the €uro means that foreign banks can lend locally without a local subsidiary as a 
source of deposits.  Instead they can simply lend through a branch in the host country. 
Lastly, the development of the banking systems in neighboring countries too will have 
ambiguous effects.  Currently many of the same foreign banks that are active in Bulgaria are 
also active in Rumania, Hungary, Serbia, Albania, and Macedonia.  When a foreign parent 
such as the National Bank of Greece owns banks in several Balkan countries it provides an 
indirect bridge between any two countries in which it has a presence.  Should it leave one of 
the pair, perhaps by selling its subsidiary to local owners, the new owners are likely to re-
establish the bridge by opening their own branch in the other country.  Thus the process of 
withdrawal by some foreign banks may result in the replacement of the withdrawing party by 
another foreign bank, this time from a neighboring country.  Whether this will result in a net 
increase in a percentage increase in foreign ownership rather than just an increase (if that) in 
the number of foreign banks is an open question. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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Conclusion 
The history of foreign banks in Bulgaria suggests one lesson and one forecast that one 
can combine in a metaphor.  The lesson is that foreign banks are opportunistic, flooding into 
newly opened environments.  The forecast is that over time any domination by foreign 
banks will wane.  The metaphor is that foreign banks are weeds in a domestic banking 
system; they are opportunistic plants in a process of succession.  
After the liberation from Ottoman rule and again after World War I, foreign banks 
entered Bulgaria in some numbers.  They did so for a third time after the fall of 
Communism.  As Nikolai Bukharin (1917) wrote:  
“It is finance capital that appears to be the all-pervading form of capital, that form 
which, like nature, suffers from a horror vacui, since it rushes to fill every "vacuum," 
whether in a "tropical," "sub­tropical," or "polar" region, if only profits flow in 
sufficient quantities.” 
Bukharin correctly identified the opportunistic nature of foreign banks.  However, he 
failed to identify a pre-condition and a consequence.  First, foreign banks require that 
conditions be propitious.  Thus even after the fall of Communism, Bulgaria resisted selling 
the country's principal banks to foreigners.  This disquiet continued a preference for 
Bulgarian and even state ownership that dated back to the country’s founding.  Although 
foreign banks re-entered Bulgaria after World War I, from the mid-1920s on the state 
directly or indirectly controlled 80 per cent of all credit (Avramov 1995).  Some observers 
have even suggested that one reason for Bulgaria’s “backwardness” is the country’s history 
of government intervention in the economy (Avramov and Sgard 1996).   
However, the experience of the 1990s brought an ever-widening recognition of the 
often overriding advantages of inviting foreign banks in (Buch 1997).  First, foreign partners 
could bring in capital, management skills, systems and experience.  Second, foreign William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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ownership of the largest banks could stop the government’s exploitation of its banks to keep 
alive failing but politically sensitive companies, and the concomitant need periodically to bail 
out the banks.  With several successful privatization completed and one still to go, the bulk 
of the Bulgarian banking system’s assets are now under foreign management. 
The second point that Bukharin missed is that the initial entry is only a phase in a 
succession process.  Some part of the entry is normal international banking activity that will 
persist for the long run, but never be of much quantitative importance.  A second part is a 
betting on the success of the Transition process.  This too is self-limiting. 
The third part, and the one that draws the most concern in Bulgaria as in many other 
countries around the world, is the majority ownership of large commercial banks by foreign 
strategic investors, that is, investors that manage the banks.  However, to the degree that the 
strategic investors are successful, this presence too is self-limiting.  As the Bulgarian banks, 
foreign and domestic-owned alike, become more competitive and adept, the foreign owners 
will no longer have a comparative advantage in general retail and commercial banking, even 
if they retain an absolute advantage.  Thus in time we can expect the owners to withdraw, 
selling their banks to Bulgarian owners.  Just as in the case of the natural world where 
eventually the normal flora re-establish themselves after a disturbance, relegating the weeds 
to a marginal presence, in time the bulk of the assets of Bulgarian banking system will again 
be managed by Bulgaria-owned banks.  Still, what the metaphor of ecological succession 
suggests is that the process is one that will unfold not over years but rather over decades. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 537 
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Table 1: Structure of the Bulgarian Banking System, 1992 - 2000 
Ownership   1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
               
State    Number  72 69 25 15 12  7  6  5  7  3  3 
  Savings  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1       
  Share  (%)  98.5 96.8 93.6 84.4 76.9 82.5    51.1 17.6 18.1
               
Bulgarian 
private  
Number  6  11 15 23 22 13 13 11  7  9  10 
  Share  (%)  1.5 3.2 6.4  15.6 22.4 15.2      6.9 9.9  10.3
               
Foreign    Subsidiaries        0 3 5 9  10  13  15  16 
  Branches        2 4 4 5 7 7 8 7 
  Share  (%)      0.1  0.6  2.3    25  42  73  72 
               
All  banks  Number  79 81 41 41 42 30 34 34 34 35 35 
  Assets (BL Bn)  463 582 810 1072 1,089 3,301 8,076 7,589 8,223 9,774 11,908
H
2 (a)   0.38 0.33 0.30 0.15 0.11 0.19  0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.09
Notes: (a) H
2 is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index. H
2 is the sum of the squares of each bank’s share of the 
total assets in the banking system. H
2 ranges between 1, which represents a situation of monopoly, and 0, 
which would represent complete dispersion. 
Source: BNB; Ignatiev (1997); Miller and Petranov (1996); Miller and Petranov (2001). 
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Table 2: Foreign Banks in Bulgaria 
    
Branches of foreign banks1 
Bank   Comment 
Alpha Bank     Ex-Ionian Bank 
Citibank     Entered 2001. 
HypoVereinsBank     Bayerische Hypo- und VereinsBank AG,  
ING Bank      
National Bank of Greece      
Piraeus Bank     Former Xiosbank. 
Société Générale     Closed during 2001. 
T.C. Ziraat Bankasi      
Locally incorporated banks with foreign ownership2 
Bank Branches Comment 
Biochim Bank  155  BA-CA Group (HypoVereinsBank) – 
99.6% 
BNP-Paribas (Bulgaria)  3  Former BNP-Dresdnerbank. BNP Paribas 
- 80%; EBRD - 20% 
Bulbank Ltd.   29  UniCredito Italiano S.A. - 85% 
Bulgaria-Invest Commercial Bank 
Ltd.  
15  Allianz Bulgaria Holding, Germany - 79% 
Bulgarian American Credit Bank    Bulgarian-American Investment Fund 
Bulgarian Post Bank  30   ALICO/CEN Balkan Holdings Limited, 
USA - 86% 
Demirbank (Bulgaria)  2  Cingillioglu-Dogan consortium 
Economic and Investment Bank   10  Former BRIBank (Bulgarian-Russian 
Investment Bank). Refco Capital Markets 
Ltd., Bermuda - 20% 
Eurobank Plc  21  Istrocapital - Bulgaria (Slovak Rep.) - 85% 
First Investment Bank   9  Eur. Privat. and Invest. Company, Austria - 
39%; EBRD - 20%; First Financial 
Brokerage House - 14%. Rep offices: 
Cyprus & Albania 
HVB Bulgaria    HypoVereinsBank Group – 99.6% 
Hebrosbank   69  iRegent Group - 98% 
Commercial Bank of Greece 
(Bulgaria) 
  ex International Commercial Bank. 
Commercial Bank of Greece - 64%. 
ProCredit Bank  7  IFC, DEG, EBRD, Commerzbank and 
IMI 
Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria)  8  Raiffeisen Central Bank Österreich  
SG Expressbank   22  Société Générale, Paris - 98%. 
Tokuda Credit Express Bank3  9  International Hospital Services Co., Japan - 
53%; Bulstrad - 33%.  
United Bulgarian Bank AD  57  National Bank of Greece - 90%; EBRD - 
10% 
Notes: 1) All foreign banks operating as branches of the parent are located in Sofia. 2) Shareholders of 
over 10%; http://www.bfia.org/banks.htm 3) Limited domestic license. 
 
  
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF 1/31/03 
Publication Authors  Date 
No. 537: Foreign banks in Bulgaria, 1875-2002  Kenneth Koford and Adrian E. 
Tschoegl 
Jan. 2003 
No. 536: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
“Healthy Organizations and the Link to Peaceful Societies: Strategies 
for Implementing Organizational Change” 
Jeannette Jackson and Maria 
Coolican 
Jan. 2003 
No. 535: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
“Workplace Violence and Security: Are there Lessons for 
Peacemaking?” 
Frances E. Zollers and Elletta 
Sangrey Callahan 
Jan. 2003 
No. 534: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
“700 Families to Feed: The Challenge of Corporate Citizenship” 
Tara J. Radin  Jan. 2003 
No. 533: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
“Governing for Genuine Profit” 
Michael J. O'Hara  Jan. 2003 
No. 532: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
“Adapting Corporate Governance for Sustainable Peace” 
Timothy L. Fort and Cindy A. 
Schipani 
Jan. 2003 
No. 531: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
“Groundings of Voice in Employee Rights” 
Dana Muir  Jan. 2003 
No. 530: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
Gender Voice and Correlations with Peace 
Morehead Dworkin and Cindy A. 
Schipani 
Jan. 2003 
No. 529: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
“The Organizational Model for Workplace Security” 
Dr. Thomas K. Capozzoli  Jan. 2003 
No. 528: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
”Nationbuilding 101: Reductionism in Property, Liberty, and Corporate 
Governance” 
O. Lee Reed  Jan. 2003 
No. 527: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, “On 
Virtue and Peace: Creating a Workplace Where People Can Flourish” 
Caryn L. Beck-Dudley and 
Steven H. Hanks 
Jan. 2003 
No. 526: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
“Novartis and the United Nations Global Compact Initiative” 
Lee A. Tavis  Dec. 2002 
No. 525: Why Transition Paths Differ: Russian and Chinese Enterprise 
Performance Compared 
Sumon Bhaumik and Saul Estrin  Jan. 2003 
No. 524: Official Regulations and the Shadow Economy: A Labour 
Market Approach 
Maxim Bouev  Dec. 2002 
No. 523: Children at Risk: Infant and Child Health in Central Asia  Cynthia Buckley  Jan. 2003 
No. 522: Wages and International Rent Sharing in Multinational Firms  John W. Budd, Jozef Konings and 
Matthew J. Slaughter 
July 2002 
No. 521: Gross Job Flows in Ukraine: Size, Ownership and Trade 
Effects 
Jozef Konings, Olga Kupets and 
Hartmut Lehmann 
Dec. 2002 
No. 520: Entrepreneurial Networking in China and Russia: Comparative 
Analysis and Implications for Western Executives 
Bat Batjargal  Dec. 2002 
No. 519: Agriculture and Income Distribution in Rural Vietnam under 
Economic Reforms: A Tale of Two Regions 
Dwayne Benjamin and Loren 
Brandt 
Mar. 2002 
No. 518: Property Rights, Labour Markets, and Efficiency in a 
Transition Economy: The Case of Rural China 
Dwayne Benjamin and Loren 
Brandt 
Mar. 2002 
No. 517: Bank Discrimination in Transition Economies: Ideology, 
Information or Incentives? 
Loren Brandt and Hongbin Li  Oct. 2002 
No. 516: Ex-ante Evaluation of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: 
The Case of Bolsa Escola 
François Bourguignon, Francisco 
H. G. Ferreira and Phillippe G. 
Leite 
Sep. 2002 
No. 515: Missed Expectations: The Argentine Convertibility  Sebastian Galiani, Daniel  
Heymann and Mariano Tommasi 
Nov. 2002 
No. 514: Job Reallocation and Productivity Growth under Alternative 
Economic Systems and Policies: Evidence from the Soviet Transition 
J. David Brown and John S. Earle  Nov. 2002 
No. 513: Cross-Border Trading as a Mechanism for Capital Flight: 
ADRs and the Argentine Crisis 
Sebastian Auguste, Kathryn M.E. 
Dominguez, Herman Kamil and 
Linda L. Tesar 
Nov. 2002 
 